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EMPLOYMENT LAW-RETIRED PILOTS AWARDED
MONETARY INTEREST ON DELAYED LUMP SUM
PENSION PAYMENTS
CHRISTOPHER W. LAMBERT*
IN STEPHENS V US AIRWAYS GROUP, the court ruled in favor
of two retired pilots (the plaintiffs) after deciding that a forty-
five-day pension payment delay was unreasonable.' The Em-
ployee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) re-
quires a lump sum pension payment to be the "actuarial
equivalent" of the "projected value of all annuity payments."
Here, the pensions satisfied this requirement, and the central
issue then became whether a forty-five-day pension distribution
delay was reasonable under Internal Revenue Service (IRS) reg-
ulations.' The plaintiffs claimed that the delay was unreasonable
because they saw no administrative necessity in the delays and
because, as a result of the unreasonable delay, they lost the abil-
ity to accrue interest while waiting.4 The court agreed.5 In the
end, public policy may benefit from this decision because air-
lines will hopefully pay pensions with more efficiency. The
court, however, was wrong for three reasons: (1) the pension
administrator could not have known the pilots' "Final Average
Earnings" until a certain period of time after each one retired;
(2) the plaintiffs had the burden to prove that the delay was
unreasonable but did not meet this burden; and (3) even if the
court was correct about the interest payments overall, damages
should have been awarded for less than the full forty-five days.'
* J.D. Candidate 2014, Southern Methodist University Dedman School of Law;
B.A. from Texas Tech University.
I Stephens v. US Airways Grp., 644 F.3d 437, 438-39, 442 (D.C. Cir. 2011), cert.
denied, 132 S. Ct. 1857 (2012).
2 Id. at 439 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1054(c) (3) (2006)).
3 Id. at 440 (citing Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)-20, Q&A 10(b)(3) (2011)).
4 Id. at 441.
5 Id. at 440-41.
6 Id. at 444-46 (Henderson, J., dissenting in part).
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The plaintiffs initially chose to have their pensions paid in the
form of one lump sum instead of in the form of monthly annu-
ity payments.7 However, when the lump sums were not paid for
forty-five days, the retirees brought suit against their former em-
ployer, US Airways, to recover the interest lost during the delay.'
The plaintiffs argued that they could have chosen an annuity
retirement plan that would have produced checks without a
waiting period, and they further argued that this delay caused
their lump sums to no longer be equal in value to what they
would have received under an annuity system.9 US Airways, how-
ever, claimed that ensuring accuracy in its calculations necessi-
tated the delay.o
The case originated in 2000 in the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Ohio, where the court dismissed it for lack
of subject-matterjurisdiction.1 1 On appeal, the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Sixth Circuit remanded the case after it found that
the ERISA argument created subject-matter jurisdiction. 1 2 The
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC), however, be-
came the new pension trustee when US Airways filed for bank-
ruptcy in 2003, and the case was transferred to the U.S. District
Court for the District of Columbia." That court granted sum-
mary judgment for PBGC, and the plaintiffs again appealed.14
In an opinion written by Judge Brown, the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia Circuit (D.C. Circuit) first
found that the lump sum payment here was the actuarial
equivalent of an annuity." The court and the dissent agreed on
actuarial equivalence because it was clear that US Airways accu-
rately calculated the lump sum payments and that these pay-
ments were fairly equal to an annuity before the delay.1 6 The
next issue was whether the delay in payment was administratively
necessary and thus reasonable."7 The court noted that "[a] pay-
ment shall not be considered to occur after the annuity starting




11 Stephens v. Ret. Income Plan for Pilots of U.S. Air, Inc., 464 F.3d 606, 607
(6th Cir. 2006).
12 Id. at 614.
13 Stephens, 644 F.3d at 439.
14 See id.
15 Id. at 440.
16 Id.; see id. at 444 (Henderson, J., dissenting in part).
17 Id. at 440-41 (controlling opinion).
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date merely because actual payment is reasonably delayed for
calculation of the benefit amount if all payments are actually
made."1 8 The court found that US Airways did not meet this
standard.19 US Airways argued that an additional eighteen days
could be necessary to determine a pilot's final month of earn-
ings. 2 0 It also presented evidence portraying a delay of twenty-
one business days as necessary to competently determine lump
sum funds and a delay of thirty calendar days as customary
within the industry.21 The court, however, found that none of
these explanations related to the administrative calculation of a
lump sum pension payment.22
The D.C. Circuit held for the plaintiffs for three reasons. First,
given that retirement was mandatory for US Airways pilots at the
age of sixty, pension administrators could plan ahead for the
calculation of each lump sum payment.23 Second, a forty-five-day
delay was more prolonged than the thirty-day delays that oc-
curred "in practice" at the time.24 Finally, the floodgates would
not be opened to lawsuits concerning de minimis amounts of in-
terest because "the probability of litigation [would] correlate []
with the length of delay."2 5
The court's first rationale was that administrators can plan
ahead and will know, with a fair amount of accuracy, what the
final month of earnings will likely be for each retiree.2 6 Debate
ensued as to whether determining the final month's earnings
required an additional eighteen days, but apparently the evi-
dence could not support this contention.27 The court provided
no reason for denying an additional eighteen days, though, be-
18 Id. at 440; Treas. Reg. §1.401(a)-20, Q&A (10) (b) (3) (2011).
19 Stephens, 644 F.3d at 442.
20 See id. at 441 n.I.
21 See id. at 440-41.
22 Id. at 442. After this court ruled for the plaintiffs, the Supreme Court denied
certiorari. See Stephens v. US Airways Grp., 132 S. Ct. 1857 (2012).
23 Stephens, 644 F.3d at 441 n.1.
24 Id. at 441.
25 Id.
26 Id. at 441 n.1; id. at 445 (HendersonJ., dissenting in part).
27 Id. at 441 n.1 (controlling opinion); id. at 445 (Henderson, J., dissenting in
part). US Airways provided a numerical breakdown of the first twenty-one busi-
ness days needed to calculate the clerical delay. Id. at 440-41 (controlling opin-
ion). It included time for data checks, benefit calculations, qualified domestic
relations checks, check transmittal, and check review. Id. These calculations were
separate from the time needed to calculate the pilot's "Final Average Earnings," a
figure that also played a role in determining the lump sum. Id. at 445 (Hender-
son, J., dissenting in part).
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cause no argument was made to show that final earnings would
not take eighteen days.28 The court's second rationale was that
even the industry norm of thirty days for a clerical delay was less
than the forty-five days taken by US Airways.29 The plaintiffs' ex-
pert testified to this norm, and the court stated that the testi-
mony merely showed that US Airways did not finish its
calculations within the time frame.o The plaintiffs used the in-
dustry standard to demonstrate that there was little correlation
between the payment delay and administrative necessity, but
PBGC likely could have used the testimony as a way of showing
that forty-five days was so close to thirty that it was also a reasona-
ble delay." The court's final rationale was that this case would
not open the floodgates to de minimis claims. 3 2 The court ex-
plained that future retirees would still have the burden to prove
an unreasonable delay and that the less likely a delay is unreasona-
ble, the less likely a retiree will even bring suit.3 3 This case does
not shut the doors on those with legally cognizable claims; in-
stead, claimants can decide for themselves whether bringing suit
would be beneficial enough to justify the legal expenses.
The dissent in this case raised multiple counterarguments to
the majority. First, although the pension coordinator knows
when a pilot will retire, a pilot's final average earning amount is
derived, at least partially, from the last month of work, which
can vary relative to previous months. Second, the dissent stated
that the court conceded that the industry norm of thirty days
was a reasonable delay.36 Third, the plaintiffs still had the bur-
den to prove that a forty-five-day wait was unreasonable.
Fourth, this case could open the door to de minimis claims;38 this
contention is in direct opposition to Judge Brown's assertion in
the controlling opinion.39 Finally, the retirees in this case were
awarded more interest than pilots retiring after them could pos-
28 See id. at 441 & n.1 (controlling opinion).






5 Id. at 445 (Henderson, J., dissenting in part).
s6 Id.
3 Id. (citing Horton v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 141 F.3d 1038, 1040
(11th Cir. 1998)).
38 Id.
3 See id. at 441 (controlling opinion).
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sibly receive, and it would be inequitable to give the plaintiffs a
greater monetary award than others."
The concurring opinion in this case focused on the first issue:
whether ERISA was satisfied at all.' Judge Kavanaugh explained
that ERISA was not satisfied, which meant that there should
have been little reason to even consider the reasonableness of
the delay." The concurring opinion relied primarily on 29
U.S.C. § 1054(c) (3), a section in ERISA which states that a lump
sum, even if calculated to equal an annuity at first, would not be
equal to that annuity after any amount of delay due to the time
value of money." To protect retirees, "'ERISA requires actuarial
equivalence between the actual distribution and the accrued ben-
efit it replaces,"' which means that an actual distribution later
on is not the actuarial equivalent of one now. 4 Judge Kava-
naugh also concluded that an IRS regulation cited by US Air-
ways does not relate to ERISA and should therefore not be
controlling.45
The court incorrectly decided this case because the specific
facts show that the delay could have been reasonable." In the
alternative, the interest awarded should only be for twenty-four
days at most, rather than the full forty-five days." The court first
addressed the question of whether the delay was reasonable,
and then it looked to whether US Airways could validate a de-
fense of administrative necessity.48 Every time US Airways gave
an explanation, however, the court rejected the reasoning as an
unlikely answer, even a "red herring," but it provided little to no
4o See id. at 446 (Henderson, J., dissenting in part) (explaining that pilots who
retired on April 1, 2000, or later-that is, most pilots retiring after the plaintiffs-
have had their pensions capped at the statutory maximum); see also Kathleen
Pender, What They'll Get: How Pension Agency Pays Out, SFGATE (May 12, 2005, 4:00
AM), http://www.sfgate.com/business/networth/article/what-they-ll-get-how-
pension-agency-pays-out-2635479.php (reporting, in 2005, that when an airline is
in bankruptcy, pilots' pension benefits may be limited to set maximums). This
note, however, discusses only the potential increase in administrative efficiency
caused by this decision.
41 Stephens, 644 F.3d at 442 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
42 Id. at 442-43.
43 Id.; see also Esden v. Bank of Bos., 229 F.3d 154, 163 (2d Cir. 2000) (requir-
ing that a lump sum payment be no less than the present ialue of an annuity to
comply with ERISA).
4 Stephens, 644 F.3d at 443 (quoting Miller v. Xerox Corp. Ret. Income Guar-
antee Plan, 464 F.3d 871, 874 (9th Cir. 2006)).
45 Id.
46 See id. at 440-41 (controlling opinion).
4 See id. at 445 (Henderson, J., dissenting in part).
48 Id. at 440-41 (controlling opinion).
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explanation.4 9 For instance, the court assumed that US Airways
had a scant amount of justification for the time it takes to add
up a pilot's final month of earnings."o The dissent, though, gave
a reasonable explanation for this additional time based on "the
number of hours logged and differentials for night pay,
'overwater pay[,]' and other adjustments.""' The dissent's expla-
nation listed various factors that could add time to the verifica-
tion of final earnings, and these factors did not even include the
need to then average all of the earnings together to confirm the
final total.52 The court incorrectly presupposed that a pension
plan would know a pilot's final earnings just because it knows
when that pilot will retire-but no evidence supports this
claim.
Furthermore, the plaintiffs had the burden of proof on the
claims in this case." The plaintiffs had to prove that the delay
was unreasonable and could do so by showing that there was no
administrative rationale for the wait.55 Once US Airways intro-
duced evidence showing that it actually did take administrative
time to calculate a lump sum payment, the burden should have
shifted back to the plaintiffs to disprove the relevance of this
evidence or offer new evidence.5 ' The court, however, disre-
garded the proof given by US Airways, even though it clearly
showed a possible reason for the clerical delay." US Airways (or
PBGC, at this point in the trial) did not have to prove adminis-
trative necessity; rather, the plaintiffs had to prove unreasonable
delay. Upon examination of the given facts, it is unlikely that the
retirees met their burden.
Even if the delay was truly unreasonable, which is unlikely, the
plaintiffs should not have been awarded the full forty-five days of
interest.59 The court noted that a twenty-one-day procedure was
possible but then discounted it as lacking proof. 0 This proce-
- 49 See id. at 441 & n.1.
50 See id. at 441 n.1.
51 Id. at 445 (Henderson, J., dissenting in part).
52 Id.
5s See id. at 441 n.1 (controlling opinion).
54 Id. at 445 (Henderson, J., dissenting in part).
5 See id.
56 See id. at 440-41 (controlling opinion).
57 See id.
58 See id. at 445 (Henderson, J., dissenting in part) (citing Horton v. Reliance
Standard Life Ins. Co., 141 F.3d 1038, 1040 (11th Cir. 1998)).
59 See id.
60 Id. at 440-41 (controlling opinion).
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dure is clear proof, though, because it substantiates one possible
and reasonable clerical process for US Airways."1 Even if final
average earnings take no time to compute, a delay of twenty-one
days for administrative calculation still seems reasonable; this
would mean that the plaintiffs should have only received inter-
est for a delay of, at most, twenty-four days-the difference be-
tween the reasonable twenty-one days and the ultimate forty-five
days. 6 2 The dissent also discussed the industry norm for delay
and how 'Judge Brown concede [d] that a delay of up to thirty
days would be reasonable."" Although it is unclear whether
Judge Brown actually conceded this point, if the industry norm
is the benchmark, then thirty days should have been the basis
for interest calculations instead of twenty-one days.6 4 The court
should have roughly based damages on a fifteen-day scale, mak-
ing the interest award only one-third of what the court
awarded.65 Either way, the full forty-five-day delay was likely an
incorrect basis for calculating damages in this case and seems to
disregard IRS regulations by removing any possible allowance of
time for pension calculations. 6
The concurring opinion gave a straightforward solution to the
ERISA issue in this case, but it failed to consider the difficulty of
meeting such a strict standard. 7 If any delay-including a rea-
sonable one-would result in an ERISA violation, then even the
waiting time for a check sent in the mail could spur a violation."
The concurrence even explained that "ERISA tolerates reasona-
ble delays" but that interest should still be paid during any
wait.6 9 What is the point of having a reasonableness exception to
ERISA while still requiring a pension plan to pay interest as if it
were being punished?7 o Such a strict standard would be burden-
some for airlines and would increase pressure on pension coor-
61 See id.
62 For clarification, the mathematical argument is that 45 - 21 = 24. Cf id. at
445 (Henderson, J., dissenting in part).
63 Id.
64 See id.; id. at 440-41 (controlling opinion). Judge Brown noted that the in-
dustry norm is thirty days after reviewing expert testimony, but Judge Brown's
controlling opinion does not seem to have fully conceded that this number deter-
mines the reasonableness standard here. See id. at 441 (controlling opinion).
65 See id. at 445 (Henderson, J., dissenting in part).
66 See id.; id. at 442 (controlling opinion).
67 See id. at 442 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
68 See id. at 443.
69 Id. (citing Contilli v. Local 705 Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters Pension Fund, 559
F.3d 720, 722 (7th Cir. 2009) (Easterbrook, C.J.)).
70 See id.
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dinators to simply finish the calculations.7 1 This pressure could
add to check accuracy problems and increase the potential for
clerical error. Although Judge Kavanaugh had a simple answer
for the problem, the resolution would not likely be so easy or
beneficial.
Although the dissent was likely correct that the delay was not
unreasonable, the court's decision may still serve as beneficial
public policy for two reasons.7 ' First, the decision might improve
payment plans for retiring pilots because airlines will be more
careful in the future about the time they take to calculate lump
sums. These pensions are extremely important to pilots. The
money represents years of hard work and dedication, and a de-
lay in payment can cause difficulties for those who rely on their
retirement savings. Second, the courts should not turn pilots
away from litigation just because interest awards might be small
compared to legal expenses.75 The dissent stated that this litiga-
tion is likely more burdensome for the pilots than it is benefi-
cial, but this argument is weak and is a point on which Judge
Brown was correct.76 Pilots should be able to seek legal redress
in the courts and will be more likely to do so if they realize an
actual delay in their pension fund payments. 77 The dissent was
also likely wrong about the inequitable nature of this lawsuit.78
Current claimants should not have their rights limited just be-
cause subsequent claimants cannot earn as much. Such a rule
would lead to substantial drawbacks for many with valid claims
and would cause unnecessary additional determinations and
steps in a single lawsuit. These two points, however, merely ap-
pear to be side arguments, and they do not affect the main argu-
ments on which the dissent relied.so
The court decided this case incorrectly because IRS regula-
tions allow for reasonable delays.8 ' Furthermore, the specific
facts all point to the conclusion that the delay here was adminis-




74 See id. at 444 (Henderson, J., dissenting in part).
75 But see id. at 445.
76 See id.; id. at 441 (controlling opinion).
77 See id. at 441 (controlling opinion).
78 See id. at 446 (Henderson, J., dissenting in part).
79 Contra id.
s0 See id. at 445-46.
81 Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)-20, Q&A 10(b)(3) (2011).
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be a blessing in disguise for pilots near retirement. Although the
awards in this case are not large in hindsight, the value of in-
creased payment certainty may pay off in the end. Overall, the
precedent that arises could decrease administrative delay and
remind pilots of their ability to take legal action, even if the case
itself was not a crushing defeat for airlines and pension plans.
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